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Motivated biases are considered under an integrative theoretical framework which 
specifies the interplay between motivation, situational affordances, and cognitive 
resources. According to this framework, motivation influences the cognitive strategies 
taken in a given situation. Then, cognitive resources are channeled to the appropriate set 
of cognitive processes suggested by the dominant motivation. The presence of cognitive 
resources allows information processing to be directed at either reaching an accurate 
decision, or overcoming reality constraints impeding one from reaching a desirable 
judgment. In the absence of cognitive resources the dominant motivation, whether it be 
accuracy or directional motivation, has a lesser impact when reaching the desired 
judgment is made difficult. In such case, salient situational cues and ambiguous 
information may determine judgments to a greater degree irrespective of the motivational 
relevance of those cues. Two studies supported the present model in two unrelated 
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The human understanding, when it has once adopted an opinion ... draws all things else 
to support and agree with it. Though there may be (more) instances to be found on the 
other side, yet these it either neglects or despises, or else by some distinction sets aside 
and rejects.  
          -Francis Bacon  
 Making accurate judgments is one key component of thinking in humans. 
Although decision makers often demonstrate the ability of making accurate judgments, 
studies on reasoning show that judgment accuracy is often altered by situational and 
idiosyncratic factors (Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; Tversky & Koehler, 1994). After a 
period of controversy, the role of motivation on judgment has been established as a 
potential source of bias, a phenomenon also referred to as motivated reasoning. Despite 
the considerable body of research devoted to this topic, the case for motivated reasoning 
has generally focused on whether these motivational biases really exist. Therefore, 
relatively little systematic investigation has been undertaken of the factors that might 
influence the occurrence and magnitude of motivationally produced judgmental bias. The 
present research addresses this gap in knowledge by proposing a model of motivated 
reasoning that encompasses three factors, namely motivation, situational affordances, and 
cognitive resources. Two studies aiming at empirically investigating this model are 
proposed. 
The Role of Motivation 
 The influence of motivation on human judgment has been a topic of continuous 
interest in the field of psychology. Early on in the 20th century, in Sigmund Freud’s 
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Psychodynamic Theory (1920), motivational biases were thought of as playing a crucial 
role in individuals’ psyche. Specifically, motivational biases were conceived as processes 
directed at protecting the self by fending off anxiety-provoking thoughts from 
consciousness. According to Freud, the ego, which is governed by the reality principle, 
defends itself from unacceptable sexual and violent impulses through a series of 
psychological strategies, which he referred to as defense mechanisms. Freud proposed 
that defense mechanisms are aimed at satisfying these sexual and violent impulses in 
socially acceptable ways. For example, through the mechanism of projection, one 
perceives a threatening trait in others in order to avoid recognizing it as part of oneself. 
Other forms of defense involve the repression or denial of unacceptable information 
which unable one to recall or simply deal with the implications of certain events. Thus, 
Freud's Psychodynamic Theory was innovative in that it suggested a series of possible 
ways in which motivated reasoning may occur (for a full review see Baumeister, Dale, & 
Sommer, 1998).  
 Despite Freud’s major influence on psychology and Francis Bacon’s insights 
quoted in the introduction, the idea of motivation influencing judgment took a very long 
time before being formally accepted and empirically demonstrated. In the realm of 
perceptual judgment for example, individuals have been traditionally thought of as 
passive observers, encoding an exact copy of the outside world, without interfering with 
the actual content. The notion that top-down processes, including motivational factors, 
could interfere with perception was a foreign concept until the end of the Second World 
War by research on functional perception. Sometimes dubbed as the ''New Look'', this 
tradition of research conceived perception as a tool in the service of one's motivation 
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(Bruner, 1957). Specifically, it was proposed that needs and values could have their 
influence on the perceptual system by accentuating and facilitating visual localization of 
goal-relevant objects. A classic demonstration of this phenomenon is Bruner and 
Goodman's (1947) early work in which children from different socio-economical status 
estimated the size of monetary coins. In comparison to children from affluent families, 
poor children, for whom the value of money was greater, overestimated the size of the 
coins. Although these early studies were later criticized for their methodology (Eiser & 
Stroebe, 1972; Tajfel, 1957), it is these early perceptual studies that first empirically 
supported the conception of motivation influencing judgments.  
 Endeavors directed at investigating motivated reasoning have provided evidence 
that motivation could impact domains far beyond those concerned with perception. 
According to Festinger’s (1957) Cognitive Dissonance Theory, aversive tensions are 
assumed to arise when willful behavior is at odds with an actor’s attitudes or core values 
(Steele, 1988). In line with this theoretical framework, individuals become motivated to 
assuage these tensions by changing their attitudes to either reduce or remove the 
discrepancy between their attitude and behavior. Consequently, Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory proposes specific instances in which motivation influences and biases individuals’ 
attitudes (i.e. judgments toward an entity). 
 Attribution processes have also been claimed to be influenced by motivational 
biases (Cialdini, Braver, & Lewis, 1974; Kelley, 1971). It has been hypothesized and 
empirically corroborated that individuals tend to attribute causality to themselves when 
their efforts have produced favorable outcomes, but attribute causality to external factors 
when the outcomes are unfavorable (e.g., Johnson, Feigenbaum, & Weiby, 1964; Jones, 
4 
Gergen, & Davis, 1962; Streufert, & Streufert, 1969). Kelley’s Attribution Theory (1967, 
1971) suggests that individuals are inclined to display such bias in an attempt to preserve 
a perception of internal control over their environment. 
More recent accounts suggest that a vast number of situations exist in which 
judgment can be altered in motivationally congruent ways. In Ross, McFarland, and 
Fletcher's study (1981) participants led to believe that toothbrushing was bad for their 
health reported having performed these behaviors in the recent past less frequently than 
participants led to believe that toothbrushing was actually regarded as a healthy behavior. 
In a similar vein, Kunda and Sanitioso (1989) found that people led to believe that certain 
personality traits are conducive to academic success came to think that they possessed 
those traits to a greater extent, compared to the control participants for whom no such 
belief was established. Other research showed that individuals are generally inclined to 
make judgments that are arguably too favorable to be objectively justified. Weinstein 
(1980) for example, provided evidence that individuals predicting the likelihood of 
occurrence of future events in their lives generally demonstrated greater optimism toward 
future desirable events. Individuals also reported that positive events were more likely to 
occur to them than to others, whereas negative events were less likely to occur to them 
than to others. 
Despite all the supportive evidence, the existence of motivational biases has been 
a matter of controversy and intense debate over the years. In fact, substantial efforts have 
been put forward to authenticate motivational biases against the critique of cognitive-
based rival interpretations. A case in point is Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 
1957; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) and Self-Perception Theory (Bem, 1967; 1972) that 
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have been pitted against each other in order to establish whether individuals' attitude 
change in dissonance studies reflected a motivational process or a cognitive process in 
which individuals were inferring their attitude from their own behavior. Similarly, 
motivational biases in causal attributions (Kelley, 1967) have been challenged by 
cognitive interpretations. In their discussion of this topic, Miller and Ross (1975) argued 
that the attribution biases claimed by several authors (e.g. Johnson et al., 1964; Kelley, 
1971) could be reinterpreted without invoking motivational constructs. In this vein, 
Miller and Ross suggested that individuals may have performance expectancies based on 
the amount of effort and level of ability they invest in a given task. Consequently, in 
instances where individuals have high performance expectancies, the occurrence of 
success would be consistent with their expectations and lead to greater internal 
attribution, whereas failure would be perceived as inconsistent with their expectations 
and therefore be attributed to external factors.    
Yet in the end, the concept of motivational biases appears to have survived the 
onslaught of cognitive reinterpretations. As Kunda (1990) noted “the case for motivated 
reasoning appears quite strong… The position that all biases are due to purely cognitive 
processes is no longer tenable” (p. 493). A large part of this success is due to 
experimental designs that manipulated participant's motivation while keeping constant 
the information presented. Using this paradigm, Klein and Kunda (1992), for example, 
made participants believe they would engage in a history trivia game with another 
individual. Participants were led to believe that this individual would either be their 
future partner or opponent. Despite being provided with similar information regarding 
that individual's prior performance, participants who thought of that person as their future 
6 
partner rated that person as better at history than participants who thought of that person 
as their future opponent. Klein and Kunda's (1992) research has been one among many 
that has led researchers to accept the role of motivation in human judgment and conclude 
that cognitive rival interpretation could not account for the available experimental results 
(Dunning, 1999; Kruglanski, 1996). 
The Role of Situational Affordances 
The research described thus far attests that motivated reasoning has constituted a 
topic of continuous interest to social psychologists. Yet, because much of the relevant 
research centered on establishing the authenticity of the phenomenon, little is known 
about the boundary conditions under which motivated reasoning may occur. About the 
only factor that has been identified as facilitating motivational biases is stimulus 
ambiguity. Several authors have observed that individuals are more likely to reach 
desirable conclusions when judgments are given on elements that are ambiguous, hence 
loosely defined and subject to multiple interpretations. Dunning, Meyerowitz, and 
Holzberg (1989) for instance, observed that individuals tended more to ascribe positive 
traits to themselves and less likely to ascribe negative traits to themselves when these 
traits where ambiguous (e.g., sophisticated) rather than well-defined (e.g., punctual).  
Similarly, Hsee (1996) discussed how “unjustifiable” (motivational) factors may 
influence judgments by referring to the concept of elasticity. Hsee proposed that 
judgments are more likely to become biased when the relative weight that should be 
attributed to the justifiable factors is ambiguous. In such circumstances, unjustifiable 
factors may come into play and influence judgment making. To illustrate Hsee's 
proposition, one could think of a wine expert tasting two different bottles of wine for a 
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competition in which one of the bottle has been produced by a good friend. If both wines 
have interesting qualities but their comparison is ambiguous, one showing “nice legs” in 
the glass (a sign of viscousness associated with high-quality wine) and the other offering 
good tannins (polyphenois generated by the grapes as well as wooden casks and 
considered the hallmark of “big” red wines) for example, it becomes difficult for the 
judge to determine the relative weight that should be given to these justifiable factors. In 
this situation, despite knowing that the winner of the competition should not be based on 
liking and sympathy, the situation allows the wine expert to unconsciously favor the old 
friend by rendering a judgment that appears to be impartial and based on justifiable 
factors. Hsee's notion of elasticity is akin to Kunda's (1990) notion of reality constraints 
(see also Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; cf. Kruglanski, 1999). Kunda suggested that in 
spite of being motivated to reach certain desired conclusions, decision makers still 
acknowledge the existence of “objective reality” which when it is clear and obvious, 
reduces one’s ability to distort judgments toward motivationally pleasing conclusions.  
Thus, stimulus ambiguity is one factor that makes distortion easy to accomplish, 
and stimulus clarity is what makes distortion difficult to accomplish in a motivationally 
desirable direction.  It is possible, however, that there are other factors, apart from 
stimulus ambiguity that affect the difficulty of distortion. For instance, the amount of 
information and its complexity may make distortion more difficult because of the 
demands of information processing that may deplete one’s cognitive resources and reduce 
one’s cognitive capacity to engage in the “cognitive work” that distortion may require. 
The same may happen when the information to be distorted appears late versus early in 
the information processing sequence, that is, after considerable resources may have been 
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expended.   
The Role of Cognitive Resources 
 Processing capacity, also referred to as working memory, is often conceptualized 
as a limited amount of cognitive resources that can be allocated to on-line cognitive tasks 
(Kahneman, 1973; Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Wickens, 1984). The presence of cognitive 
resources allows working memory to sustain attention effectively toward information 
processing that is goal relevant. Consequently, given that the choice of cognitive 
strategies reflects the corresponding motivational state that the individual is in 
(Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Sorrentino & Higgins, 
1986), processing capacity may be as important for reaching both accurate and biased 
judgments. The latter statement is congruent with the Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
persuasion (ELM, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) which proposes that motivation channels 
available cognitive resources toward its fulfillment. Consequently: “A wide variety of 
variables can affect a person’s motivation and ability to consider issue-relevant arguments 
in either a relatively objective or in a relatively biased manner” (Cacioppo et al., 1986, p. 
152).  
In circumstances where cognitive resources are allocated elsewhere or have been 
exhausted by a prior fatiguing task, they may be insufficient to accomplish the 
motivational goal. Consequently, insufficient cognitive resources may undermine the 
probability of effective goal-pursuit. A case in point is Thompson and colleagues’ (1994) 
work showing that individuals are able to form accurate impressions only when their 
accuracy motivation is paired with sufficient cognitive resources. Accuracy motivated 
individuals under cognitive load, made impressions similar to individuals lacking the 
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motivation to be accurate.  
 Recently, Chen (2009) obtained evidence that the process involved in the 
fulfillment of the accuracy motivation seems also involved in the fulfillment of 
directional motivations, resulting in motivational biases. In her study, participants led to 
identify with their University through a subliminal priming manipulation were more 
likely to favor their school's sport team over a rival team for a national athletic award 
only if they had the necessary cognitive resources. These findings are interesting as they 
run counter to the hypothesis that “more is better”, that is, that the more processing 
capacity one has the more accurate is one's judgment. In sum, it appears that cognitive 
resources can be beneficial to reach either accurate or biased judgments.  The question is 
under what conditions they would do either.  
The Present Research 
 From the various streams of evidence reviewed above, several principles can be 
derived concerning the conditions under which accurate or biased judgments will occur, 
and the role that resources will play in the formation of such judgments. First, motivation 
influences the choice of cognitive strategies that are preferred in a given situation. 
Motivation introduces goals to which the strategies constitute means. Accuracy 
motivation fosters revision of beliefs and leads individuals to process information more 
deeply before committing to a judgment. Directional motivation orients cognitive 
processes toward reaching a desired conclusion. Second, the decision making process is 
constrained, but not entirely limited, by the cognitive task environment in which the 
judgments are made.  Some task environments afford an easier accomplishment of one’s 
goal than other environments. The more difficult is goal accomplishment in a given 
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environment the more cognitive resources are required to do so. Third, cognitive 
resources are channeled to the appropriate set of cognitive processes suggested by the 
dominant motivation. The presence of cognitive resources allows information processing 
to be directed at either reaching an accurate decision, or overcoming the reality 
constraints. Assuming that resources are needed, in their absence the dominant 
motivation, whether it be accuracy or directional motivation, will have a lesser impact on 
judgments. In the absence (vs. presence) of resources salient situational cues may 
determine judgments to a greater degree irrespective of the motivational relevance of 
those cues.  
 The foregoing three principals suggest two major hypotheses: (1) under dominant 
accuracy motivation, accurate judgments will occur, except, when the judgment maker 
does not have the necessary cognitive resources to process the information, and when the 
environment is conducive to judgment biases; in other words, when the environment is 
conducive to judgmental biases (reality constraints are weak, and biasing information is 
highly accessible), reaching unbiased judgments will be positively related to the 
availability of cognitive resources. However, (2) under dominant directional motivation 
judgments will generally be biased, except in situations where the judgment maker does 
not have the necessary cognitive resources to outmatch the reality constraints.  
 In the following two studies, we put these hypotheses to empirical test. To 
increase confidence in the conclusions, we rely on a convergent approach that allows the 
validation of our findings via alternative operations of the major constructs. Specifically, 
in Study 1, motivation was manipulated through subliminal priming, whereas in Study 2 
motivation was elicited through accountability instructions. Different manipulations of 
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cognitive resources were employed; Study 1 directly manipulated cognitive resources 
through a cognitive load manipulation, whereas in Study 2 individuals' circadian cycle 
combined with different testing periods were used as a proxy for the presence of 
cognitive resources. Finally, different operationalizations of reality constraints were also 
used across studies. In Study 1, Situational affordances (reality constraints) were 
manipulated through stimulus saliency, whereas Study 2 examined in these terms the 
influence of stimulus ambiguity. 
Study 1 
The goal of Study 1 was to carry out the first empirical test of our model 
integrating motivation, situational affordances, and cognitive resources as these may 
conjointly determine individuals’ judgments. The primary focus of Study 1 concerned 
motivated reasoning in the realm of perceptual judgments. Specifically, we addressed 
whether motivation, situational affordances, and cognitive resources may shape 
individuals’ responses to social rejection. In their review on the need to belong, 
Baumeister & Leary (1995) have advanced that forming and maintaining social bonds is 
a fundamental human motivation. In line with this proposition, several authors have 
found evidence that individuals can be very sensitive to cues indicating potential rejection 
(Pickett & Gardner, 2005) and engage in affiliation efforts (e.g., imitating others) in 
response to social exclusion (Lakin & Chartrand, 2005). Based on this reasoning, we 
argue that making individuals feel rejected might induce a directional motivation to 
regain a sense of belonging which would translate into perceiving warm traits in others. 
Thus in line with our theoretical framework, we hypothesized that rejected 
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individuals (directional motivation) would perceive more warm traits in others, except in 
situation where the environment is not conducive to such judgments (hard to distort) and 
participants are under cognitive load. When individuals are motivated to reach an 
accurate judgment, we hypothesized that individuals will process all information at their 
disposal before reaching a judgment. Under cognitive load, we hypothesized that 
individuals with an accuracy motivation would not fully take into account the 
environmental information and thus rely on salient information to make a judgment. 
Consequently, when accuracy motivated individuals are deprived of cognitive resources 
they would be more likely to succumb to an environmentally prompted stimulus bias. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Two-hundred and twenty-six University of Maryland undergraduates (126 
women, Mage = 19.92 years, SDage = 2.17) participated and received partial credit toward 
fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 
(Motivation: accuracy vs. rejection) X 2 (Cognitive resources: load vs. no-load) X 2 
(Situational affordances: eyes vs. mouth) between-subjects design. 
Procedure and Materials 
 Upon their arrival at the lab, participants were invited to participate in two 
unrelated studies. In the first study, they were told that the researchers were interested in 
investigating people's speed in distinguishing words from non-words. Participants 
engaged in a lexical decision task during which they were subliminally primed with 
either 8 words relating to accuracy (e.g., accurate, correct, true), or 8 rejection-related 
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words (e.g., rejected, isolated, castaway). In the lexical decision task, participants were 
asked to indicate whether strings of letters constitute meaningful words or not. Some of 
the letter strings were neutral words (e.g. lamp), or pronounceable non-words (e.g. pagie). 
Prior to each letter string, subliminal primes were presented for a period of 17 
milliseconds, backward masked. It was expected that the rejection primes would enhance 
the motivation to seek social acceptance, whereas the accuracy related-words were 
expected to enhance accuracy motivation. Participants were then ushered to another room 
in order to participate in the second study that allegedly pertained to artistic judgments. 
Participants were told that they would see a painting on a computer screen for a period of 
20 seconds, and that their artistic opinion would then be sought.  
Following these instructions, participants in the cognitive load condition were told 
that the researchers were interested in how people perceive art when they are thinking of 
something else, and therefore, they would memorize and retain a 9-digit number until the 
end of the experiment. These participants were then given twenty seconds to retain this 
number. Participants in the no-load condition waited 20 seconds for the next part of the 
study without having to memorize any numbers. 
Subsequently, all participants were presented with the Mona Lisa painting for 
twenty seconds. The Mona Lisa painting was selected because of its capacity to elicit 
perceptual and judgmental biases. Livingstone's work (2002) on the biological 
mechanisms of perception has recently elucidated a curious optical illusion. Livingstone 
found that the Mona Lisa's smile (which is widely referred to as elusive) can be perceived 
differently depending on how one looks at the painting. According to Livingstone's 
research, the famous Mona Lisa smile is almost entirely drawn in low-spatial 
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frequencies1 which are best seen by our peripheral vision (Livingstone, 2000). Hence, by 
looking at the Mona Lisa’s eyes or the background, her expression appears more cheerful 
than when one focuses directly at her mouth. As Livingstone puts it: “She (the Mona 
Lisa) smiles until you look at her mouth, and then it fades, like a dim star that disappears 
when you look directly at it”. Based on these findings, we developed a manipulation in 
which the Mona Lisa's eyes or mouth was rendered salient by temporarily adding glitters 
for a few milliseconds (every 5 seconds) on these particular areas. Based upon 
Livingstone's evidence, reality constraints suggesting a lack of smiling should be harder 
to overcome when the mouth is made salient than when the eyes are made salient.  
After exposure to the painting, participants were asked to rate the extent to which 
the Mona Lisa is agreeable, friendly, welcoming, and smiling, on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from -3 (Not Agreeable at All) to +3 (Very Agreeable). Serving as a manipulation 
check, participants under cognitive load were asked to type in the 9-digit number retained 
throughout the experiment. Participants were then be fully debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
Rejected individuals were expected to perceive the Mona Lisa as more agreeable, 
welcoming, friendly, and smiling, except in the condition in which her mouth was made 
salient (harder to distort) and they were under cognitive load. Individuals primed with 
accuracy words were expected to perceive the Mona Lisa with warmer traits when their 
                                         
1 Spatial frequency is a measure of how detailed an image is. Pictures with higher spatial frequency are 
sharper and more detailed than pictures with lower spatial frequency. Every picture is composed of both 
high and low spatial frequency patterns. These patterns are layered on top of each other and visual 
perception depends on how one looks at them. Central vision is the work of the macula and the millions 
of cone cells facilitate the perception of fine grain details (high spatial frequency), whereas peripheral 
vision treats broad patterns (low spatial frequency) with the rod cells outside the macula area. In the 
case of the Mona Lisa, her smile is drawn in a low-spatial frequency pattern which is then more easily 
seen by the peripheral vision (i.e., indirect look). 
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attention was drawn to her eyes (easy to distort) and they were under cognitive load. 
Results 
Manipulation Check. To ensure that participants in the cognitive load condition 
were indeed under constrained processing capacity, we examined whether they 
remembered the 9-digit number that they had to retain throughout the experiment. Based 
on Miller’s (1956) work on information processing capacity, individuals who 
remembered at least 7 out of 9 digits were kept in the analyses. Nine individuals failed to 
respect this cut-off point, leaving two-hundred and seventeen participants for subsequent 
analyses. 
  Perception of Warmth. In our first analysis, we subjected the agreeable, 
friendly, welcoming, and smiling items to a principal-components analysis (PCA). This 
analysis produced a one-component solution that accounted for 71% of the total variance. 
The scree test and Kaiser’s rule all indicated the extraction of one component.  The 
eigenvalue for this component was 2.85. Consequently, the four items were averaged into 











Principal Component Analysis of Perceived Warm Traits (Study 1). 





Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 Main Analyses. A 2 (Cognitive resources: load vs. no load) X 2 (Situational 
affordances: eyes vs. mouth) ANOVA was performed on the perception of Mona Lisa’s 
warmth for each motivational state.2 Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations 








                                         
2 Despite that we hypothesized two different result patterns between accuracy and directional motivation, 
the expected patterns are not meant to be detected by a three-way interaction. This is so because the 
angle at which the lines intersect are expected to be the same across plots, the only difference being that 
the simple effect of cognitive resources at each level of the environment variable is shifted up by a 
constant from one graph to the other. 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviation of Perceived Warm Traits as a Function of Motivational 
factors, Situational Affordances, and Cognitive Resources (Study 1). 
 Accuracy                        Rejection 
         Load     No-Load           Load       No-Load 
Estimate M SD    M     SD      M    SD      M    SD 
Mouth .82 .78  .85    .67     .70    1.07     1.38    .76 
Eyes 1.70 .74  1.07    .96    1.49    .74     1.43    .97 
 
Under accuracy motivation, results indicated a marginal main effect of resources, 
F (1, 103) = 3.54, p =.06. Participants perceived greater warmth under cognitive load (M 
= 1.30, SD = .87) than under no load (M = .98, SD = .85). Results also indicated a main 
effect of situational affordances. Consistent with Livingstone’s (2000) findings, 
participants perceived greater warmth in the eyes condition (M = 1.40, SD = .90) than in 
the mouth condition (M = .84, SD = .72), F (1, 103) = 12.04, p = .001.  More importantly, 
these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F (1, 103) = 4.29, p =.04. 
Orthogonal planned comparisons were performed to test our first hypothesis that under 
dominant accuracy motivation judgments would be more likely to succumb to 
environmentally prompted stimulus bias when judgment makers do not have the 
necessary cognitive resources to process the information, and when the environment is 
conducive to judgmental biases. Participants in the eyes/cognitive load condition (+3) 
were thus compared to all three other cells (all given a weight of -1). Planned 
comparisons revealed a significant contrast, indicating that participants in the 
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eye/cognitive load condition perceived the Mona Lisa has warmer than any other cells 
under accuracy motivation, t (103) = 4.52, p < .001. Other contrasts were conducted in 
order to examine if the three other groups significantly distinguished themselves among 
each other. As hypothesized, no difference was found (all ps > .05). Figure 1a illustrates 
the pattern of results. 
 
Figure 1a. Perception of the Mona Lisa’s Warmth under Accuracy Motivation as a 
Function of Cognitive Resources and Situational Affordances. 
Under directional motivation, results indicated a marginal main effect of 
resources, F (1, 106) = 3.29, p = .07, indicating that participants perceived greater 
warmth in the no-load condition (M = 1.41, SD = .87) than in the load condition (M = 
1.14, SD = .97). Results also indicated a main effect of situational affordances. 
Participants perceived greater warmth in the eyes condition (M = 1.46, SD = .84) than in 
the mouth condition (M = 1.02, SD = .99), F (1, 106) = 6.08, p = .01, replicating, once 
again, Livingstone’s (2000) findings. These main effects were qualified by a significant 
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interaction F (1, 103) = 4.55, p = .03. Orthogonal planned comparisons were performed 
to test our second hypothesis that under dominant directional motivation judgment 
makers would tend to perceive greater warmth in the Mona Lisa, except in situations 
where they do not have the necessary cognitive resources to outmatch the reality 
constraints. Participants in the mouth/cognitive load condition (+3) were thus compared 
to all three other cells (all given a weight of -1). Planned comparisons revealed a 
significant contrast t (106) = -3.65, p < .001, indicating that under directional motivation, 
participants in the mouth/cognitive load condition indeed gave lower warmth ratings to 
the Mona Lisa than any other cells. Other contrasts were conducted in order to see if the 
three other groups significantly distinguished themselves among each other. As 
hypothesized, no difference was found (all ps > .05). Figure 1b illustrates the pattern of 
results. 
 
Figure 1b. Perception of the Mona Lisa’s Warmth under Directional Motivation as a 
Function of Cognitive Resources and Situational Affordances. 
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Discussion 
Results of Study 1 provide initial evidence for our model of motivated reasoning 
based on the role of motivation, cognitive resources, and situational affordances in a 
situation of perceptual judgment. Across cells, individuals under dominant accuracy 
motivation kept a relatively positive impression of the Mona Lisa, seeing her as warm, 
agreeable, friendly, and welcoming. However, such impression was exacerbated when 
information processing capacity was restrained by the cognitive load manipulation and 
biasing information was made accessible by attracting individuals’ attention on the Mona 
Lisa’s eyes. These results thus suggest that when processing capacity is insufficient, 
accuracy motivation is unable to follow its course and judgments tend to be predicated on 
accessible information. In instances where biasing information was made more accessible 
(eyes condition), processing capacity coupled with accuracy motivation allowed one to 
resist biasing information. Consequently under those conditions, participants’ impression 
did not become overly positive. 
Results also indicated that across cells, individuals under dominant directional 
motivation also kept a relatively positive impression of the Mona Lisa. However, results 
indicated a different pattern of results such that impressions were kept at higher levels, 
except in the cell where individuals where deprived of cognitive resources and the 
biasing information was less accessible (mouth condition). These results thus suggest that 
limited processing capacity impedes one from overcoming reality constraints and from 
reaching a motivationally congruent judgment – in this case perceiving that the Mona 
Lisa with warm traits (a judgment one would be motivated to see if one had been 
rejected). In addition, as predicted by our model, when the biasing information was made 
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highly accessible (eyes condition), cognitive resources were not necessary to reach a 
favorable judgment. 
Whereas Study 1 empirically supported our theoretical model in the realm of 
perceptual judgments of others, Study 2 aimed at generalizing our model to judgments 
toward the self.  
Study 2 
The goal of Study 2 was to conceptually replicate the findings of Study 1 using a 
different methodology. Study 2 investigated the phenomenon of self-serving biases, and 
its most common demonstration, the well-known ''above average'' effect. This effect 
refers to people's propensity to assess their own capacities as above average when 
comparing themselves to their peers (Svenson, 1981; Dunning et al., 1989). The 
underlying paradox of the above average effect revolves around the fact that for any 
given attribute it is mathematically impossible for everyone to be systematically above 
the mean. It has been found that the above average effect is a very common bias across 
very different domains, such as driving ability (Svenson, 1981), ethics (Baumhart, 1968), 
health (Larwood, 1978; Weinstein, 1980), and managerial skills (Larwood & Whittaker, 
1977).  In a series of experiments, Dunning and colleagues (1989) demonstrated that 
ambiguously defined traits were subjected to the above average effect to a greater extent 
than clearly defined traits. Such view is consistent with our paradigm. However, as 
Dunning and colleagues (1989) underscored, their research did not provide any insights 
regarding factors that may prompt the occurrence of self-serving biases. Our paradigm 
appears well suited to provide such insights in terms of the interplay between motivation 
and cognitive processes as described above. Consequently, we revisited Dunning and 
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colleagues' research (1989) and included the variables implied by the present analysis to 
afford a fuller comprehension of the above average effect.  
 In Study 2, accuracy and directional motivations were activated consciously, 
instead of unconsciously. In addition, we operationally defined the amount of cognitive 
resources available to the individual in terms of this person’s circadian rhythm, a 
procedure that has proven successful in past research (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990; 
Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008). The rationale for this procedure is predicated upon self-
report evidence that show that most individuals possess a consistent preference for 
daytime or nighttime activities. These preferences arise presumably because they reflect 
times where individuals experience their physical and mental peak (Smith, Reilly, & 
Midkiff, 1989). These self-report claims are also substantiated by biological reports 
showing better cognitive performance for individuals who’s daily functioning is in 
synchrony with their circadian rhythm, compared to individuals in circadian rhythm 
asynchrony (Dijk, Duffy, & Czeisler, 1992).  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 One hundred and fifty University of Maryland undergraduates (89 women, Mage = 
19.41 years, SDage = 1.26) participated and received partial credit toward fulfillment of a 
course requirement. The experiment proceeded in two phases. During the first phase, 
participants filled out a morningness scale. In the second phase, which occurred 2 days 
later, participants performed a writing task and compared themselves to their peers on 
multiple personality dimensions. In the second phase, participants were randomly 
23 
assigned to a 2 (Motivation: accuracy vs. directional) X 2 (Cognitive resources: circadian 
match vs. mismatch) X 2 (Situational affordances: ambiguous vs. clear-cut personality 
traits) mixed-design ANOVA. 
Procedure and Materials 
Phase 1. The Morningness Scale (Smith et al., 1989) was administered to 
participants at the onset of phase 1. The Morningness Scale is a 13-item instrument 
assessing people's preferences for morning and evening activities. A sample item is, 
''During the first half hour after having awakened in the morning, how tired do you feel?''. 
Responses to this question are made on the following scale: 1 = Very tired, 2 = Fairly 
tired, 3 = Fairly refreshed, and 4 = Very refreshed. A composite morningness score was 
then computed by summing across the participant's responses to the items. Scores range 
from 13 (extreme evening type) to 55 (extreme morning type). Based on this score, 
participants were classified as evening or morning-type person based on a median split 
procedure. 
Phase 2. Participants categorized as morning or as evening individuals on the 
basis of the Morningness Scale of Phase 1 were randomly assigned to a morning or 
evening lab session in Phase 2. Therefore, during Phase 2, morning-type participants 
coming to the lab in the morning and evening-type participants coming in the evening 
(circadian-match conditions), were expected to be at their peak in terms of cognitive 
resources. We expected the opposite to occur for participants in the circadian-mismatch 
condition. The morning and the evening lab sessions were held at 8-9 a.m. and 7-8 p.m., 
respectively. During Phase 2 session, participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they felt “energized” on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 
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(Extremely).  
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of 2 writing tasks. Participants 
assigned to the directional motivation condition were asked to: 
Write about a time in which you felt intense failure in an intellectual 
domain, a time that you felt as if you were not very smart. This failure can 
be academic in nature (e.g. a time in which you failed a class or an exam) 
or can be a failure outside of school (e.g. a time in which you tried but 
failed to understand something important). 
 Similar reliving tasks have proven to be effective at producing 
experiences of intellectual failure (Knowles & Gardner, 2008). In their meta-
analyses, Campbell and Sedikides’s (1999) have demonstrated a robust self-
serving bias in response to self-esteem threats. In line with their work, we 
expected that our manipulation of intellectual failure would instigate a strong 
motivation for individuals to regain a positive self-image through self-serving 
judgments.   
 Participants assigned to the accuracy motivation were also given a writing 
task, of a neutral kind intended to have then engage in the same activity as their 
counterparts in the directional motivation condition. Participants in the accuracy 
condition were specifically asked to:  
Write about the food that you had yesterday at lunchtime. For example, 
describe the texture, the temperature, and the type of cuisine that you had. 
You can also include where you were and the period of the day at which 
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this event occurred. 
  Following the writing task, participants were presented with a personality 
questionnaire in which they were asked to assess their standing among other UMD 
students on 28 different personality traits. In addition to these instructions, participants in 
the accuracy condition were told about the importance of ''accurate self-perception'', that 
honesty is crucial when performing the upcoming task because the validity of the test is 
at stake. Moreover, participants in the accuracy condition were told that they would 
discuss their answers with the experimenter at the end of the experiment. This procedure 
has been previously found to be successful in manipulating accuracy motivation and 
attenuating motivational biases (Freund & Kruglanski, 1985, Kruglanski & Freund, 1983, 
Tetlock, 1983; 1985). Additionally, to strengthen the accuracy manipulation even further, 
participants pledged on their honor that they would be as accurate as possible by 
transcribing a modified version of the University honor code.  
 Participants were then presented with the personality questionnaire. The 28 
personality traits were exactly the same as those employed by Dunning and colleagues 
(1989) and can be divided into 4 categories: ambiguous positive (i.e., sensitive, 
sophisticated, idealistic, disciplined, sensible, ingenious, quick), ambiguous negative 
(i.e., neurotic, inconsistent, impractical, naive, submissive, compulsive, insecure), 
unambiguous positive (i.e., neat, well read, mathematical, thrifty, athletic, studious, 
punctual), and unambiguous negative (i.e., sarcastic, wordy, sloppy, clumsy, gullible, 
gossipy, bragging). These personality traits appeared on the questionnaire in no particular 
order. Participants indicated their standing on each trait among UMD students using a 7-
point scale ranging from -3 (I exhibit this trait much less than other UMD students) to 0 
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(I exhibit this trait to about the same degree as other UMD students) to +3 (I exhibit this 
trait much more than other UMD students). This procedure replicates Dunning and 
colleagues' (1989) methodology. 
 We expected that under dominant accuracy motivation, self-serving biases would 
be greater when personality traits are ambiguous (easy to distort) and individuals do not 
have sufficient cognitive resources (mismatch condition). We predicted that this pattern 
of results would occur independently of the valence of the personality traits being 
assessed.  
 We also predicted that accuracy motivation would allow one to suppress the self-
serving bias entirely by showing personality assessment non-different from 0 (indicating 
I’m average). However, we predicted that individuals would succumb to the above 
average effect when assessing ambiguous personality traits without sufficient cognitive 
resources. 
 In contrast, under dominant directional motivation, self-serving biases were 
expected to be of a lesser magnitude when the personality traits being assessed are clear-
cut (hard to distort) and individuals do not have the necessary cognitive resources to 
overcome the reality constraints (mismatch condition).  We predicted that this pattern 
of results would occur independently of the valence of the personality traits being 
assessed. In addition, under similar conditions, we also predicted that participants would 
not succumb to the above average effect. All other conditions were expected to show 
self-rating significantly different from zero. 
Results 
 Fourteen participants did not show up to the second phase of the study, thus 
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leaving one hundred and thirty-six participants left for analyses. 
Manipulation Check. An ANOVA was conducted on the self-report measures 
administered at the onset of Phase two to assess participants’ level of energy. The analysis 
revealed that participants in the circadian mismatch condition (M = 2.91, SD = 1.19) felt 
they had less energy than participants in the circadian match condition (M = 3.37, SD = 
1.20), F (1, 134) = 4.96, p = .02. These findings suggest that, as intended, our 
manipulation of resources depletion via circadian rhythm mismatch was effective. 
Main Analyses. A 2 (Cognitive resources: circadian match vs. mismatch) X 2 
(Situational affordances: ambiguous vs. clear-cut traits) X 2 (Traits valence: positive vs. 
negative) mixed design ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of self versus 
others when under accuracy motivation. The three-way interaction yielded significant 
results F (1, 69) = 15.71, p < .001. Thus, we investigated this interaction by looking at the 
2 two-way interactions composing it. Figure 2a and 2b illustrate the pattern of results. 
 
Figure 2a. Self vs. Other Rating of Positive Personality Traits under Accuracy Motivation 
as a Function of Cognitive Resources and Situational Affordances. 
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Figure 2b. Self vs. Other Rating of Negative Personality Traits under Accuracy 
Motivation as a Function of Cognitive Resources and Situational Affordances. 
A 2 (Cognitive resources) X 2 (Situational affordances) mixed-design ANOVA 
was conducted on the positive personality traits ratings. Results revealed a main effect of 
situational affordances, which indicated that participants tended to rate themselves more 
highly on ambiguous traits (M = .79, SD = .64) than on clear-cut traits (M = .45, SD = 
.62), F (1, 69) = 22.06, p < .001, replicating Dunning and colleagues (1989) ambiguity 
effect. A main effect of cognitive resources was also significant showing that participants 
tended to rate themselves more highly on personality traits in the mismatch (M = .85, SE 
= .08) than in the match condition (M = .45, SE = .07), F (1, 69) = 11.74, p = .001.  The 
two-way interaction was found to be statistically significant, F (1, 69) = 12.60, p = .001. 
Simple effects revealed that when personality traits were clear-cut, personal ratings did 
not differ between the match (M = .41, SD = .66) and mismatch conditions (M = .51, SD 
= .57), t (69) = -.71, p = .47. However, as expected, when personality traits were 
ambiguous, participants in the mismatch (M = 1.19, SD = .54) condition rated themselves 
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more highly on positive personality than in the match condition (M = .50, SD = .55), t 
(69) = 5.19, p < .05. Further analyses revealed that self-serving biases were significantly 
greater for participants in the mismatch condition rating themselves on positive 
ambiguous traits than on positive clear-cut traits (M = .51, SD = .57), t (29) = 6.30, p < 
.05, and on positive clear-cut traits given by participants in the match condition (M = .41, 
SD = .66), t (69) = 5.26, p < .05. 
A 2 (Cognitive resources) X 2 (Situational affordances) repeated-measure 
ANOVA was conducted on the negative personality traits ratings given by participants 
under accuracy motivation. Results indicated a main effect of trait situational affordances, 
with participants rating themselves more highly on negative ambiguous traits (M = -.48, 
SD = .68) than on negative clear-cut traits (M = -.13, SD = .66), F (1, 69) = 17.91, p < 
.001. A main effect of cognitive resources was also significant, showing that ratings were 
less positive in the mismatch (M = -.46, SE = .10) than in the match (M = -.19, SE = .08) 
condition, F (1, 69) = 3.99, p < .05.  The two-way interaction was found to be marginally 
significant, F (1, 69) = 3.36, p = .07. Simple effects revealed that when personality traits 
were clear-cut no rating difference were found between the match (M = -.09, SD = .71) 
and mismatch conditions (M = -.20, SD = .60), t (69) = -.65, p = .51. However, as 
expected, participants in the mismatch (M = -.72, SD = .59) condition rated themselves 
lower on ambiguous traits than in the match condition (M = -.30, SD = .68), t (69) = 2.72, 
p < .05. Further analyses revealed that for negative traits, ratings on ambiguous 
characteristics by participants in the mismatch condition were also significantly higher 
than ratings given on clear-cut traits given by participants in the mismatch condition (M = 
-.20, SD = .60), t (29) = -4.07, p < .05, and clear-cut ratings given by participants in the 
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match condition (M = -.09, SD = .71), t (69) = 3.94, p < .05. 
A 2 (Cognitive resources: circadian match vs. mismatch) X 2 (Situational 
affordances: ambiguous vs. clear-cut traits) X 2 (Traits valence: positive vs. negative) 
mixed design ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of self versus others when 
under directional motivation. The three-way interaction yielded significant results F (1, 
63) = 10.77, p < .05. Thus, we investigated this interaction by looking at the 2 two-way 
interactions composing it. Figure 2c and 2d illustrate this pattern of results. 
 
Figure 2c. Self vs. Other Rating of Positive Personality Traits under Directional 
Motivation as a Function of Cognitive Resources and Situational Affordances. 
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Figure 2d. Self vs. Other Rating of Negative Personality Traits under Directional 
Motivation as a Function of Cognitive Resources and Situational Affordances. 
 A 2 (Cognitive resources) X 2 (Situational affordances) mixed-design ANOVA 
was conducted on the positive personality traits ratings. Results indicated a main effect of 
situational affordances with ambiguous traits (M = 1.04, SD = .47) being rated more 
positively than clear-cut traits (M = .66, SD = .60), F (1, 63) = 22.33, p < .001. The main 
effect of cognitive resources was also significant with ratings in the match condition (M = 
.96, SE = .07) being more positive than ratings in the mismatch condition (M = .74, SE = 
.07), F (1, 63) = 4.85, p = .03. The two-way interaction was also found to be statistically 
significant, F (1, 63) = 7.28, p < .05. Simple effects revealed that when positive 
personality traits were clear-cut participants gave higher ratings in the match (M = .88, 
SD = .60) than in the mismatch condition (M = .44, SD = .51), t (63) = 3.15, p < .05. In 
line with our predictions, ambiguous positive personality traits were not rated differently 
in the match (M = 1.05, SD = .47) than in the mismatch condition (M = 1.04, SD = .48), t 
(63) = .02, p = .98. Further analyses revealed that self-ratings on positive clear-cut traits 
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by participants in the mismatch condition were also significantly lower than self-ratings 
given on positive ambiguous traits given by participants in the match condition (M = 
1.04, SD = .47), t (63) = -4.93, p < .05, and ambiguous ratings in mismatch condition (M 
= 1.04, SD = .48), t (31) = -5.86, p < .05. 
A 2 (Cognitive resources) X 2 (Situational affordances) mixed-design ANOVA 
was conducted on the negative personality traits ratings given by participants under 
directional motivation. Results indicated a main effect of trait situational affordances, 
with ambiguous traits (M = -.68, SD = .69) being rated more negatively than clear-cut 
trait (M = -.42, SD = .76), F (1, 63) = 7.15, p = .01. A main effect of cognitive resources 
was also significant, showing that ratings were more negative in the match (M = -.74, SE 
= .10) than in the mismatch (M = -.36, SE = .10) condition, F (1, 63) = 7.04, p < .05.  The 
two-way interaction was found to be statistically significant, F (1, 63) = 4.24, p = .04. 
Simple effects revealed that when personality traits were clear-cut, participants in the 
match condition (M = -.71, SD = .74) gave lower rating than in the mismatch condition 
(M = -.12, SD = .66), t (63) = 3.33, p < .05. However, as expected, no ratings difference 
were found on the negative ambiguous traits between the match (M = -.77, SD = .59) and 
mismatch conditions (M = -.59, SD = .79), t (63) = 1.03, p = .30. Further analyses 
revealed that ratings on clear negative traits by participants in the mismatch condition (M 
= -.12, SD = .66) were also significantly higher than ratings given on negative ambiguous 
traits given by participants in the match condition (M = -.77, SD = .59), t (63) = 4.13, p < 
.05, and ambiguous ratings in the mismatch condition (M = -.59, SD = .79), t (31) = 3.69, 
p < .05. 
Self-Serving biases. Self-rating means of every experimental condition were 
33 
analyzed to assess whether they were significantly different from zero, which in this 
cases indicates an “I’m average” response. Results indicated that all cells means were 
different from zero, showing that people stated that they are anything but average. As can 
been seen in Table 3, only two cell means did not conform to this pattern. As predicted, 
the results indicated that under accuracy motivation, participants’ self-ratings in the 
match condition did not succumb to the “more than average effect” when assessing 
negative clear-cut traits, t (40) = .83, p = .40. Similarly, participants under directional 
motivation in the mismatch condition did not show evidence of self-serving biases when 
rating negative clear-cut traits, t (31) = 1.10, p = .27. However, contrary to our 
hypotheses, participants under accuracy motivation and directional motivation were 














Table 3  
Mean Rating of Self Versus Other Students as a Function of Motivation, Cognitive 
Resources, Trait Desirability, and Ambiguity (Study 2). 
  Accuracy  Directional 





















Ambiguous Negative -.72* .59  -.30* .68  -.59* .79  -.77* .59 
 Positive 1.19* .54  .50* .55  1.04* .47  1.04* .47 
Clear-cut Negative -.20* .60  -.09 .71  -.12 .66  -.71* .74 
 Positive .51* .57  .41* .66  .44* .51  .88* .60 
Note, n = 136. Subjects responded on scale ranging from -3 (I exhibit trait much less than 
other UMD students) to 0 (I exhibit trait to the same degree as other UMD students) to 3 
(I exhibit trait much more than other UMD students). 
* Significantly different from zero, p < .001. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 provide additional support for our model of motivated 
reasoning in the domain of self-related judgments. Specifically, the results of Study 2 
replicate previous findings by Dunning and colleagues (1989) on the role of trait 
ambiguity in prompting the above average effect. However, our results expand on these 
findings by integrating the role of motivation and cognitive resources affording further 
understanding of factors underlying the magnitude and occurrence of self-serving biases. 
Three major findings were evidenced: 
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The first finding concerns judgments under accuracy motivation. Our results 
indicate that under accuracy motivation the magnitude of self-serving biases is greater 
when processing capacity is limited and the object of one’s judgment affords leeway for 
interpretation (i.e., ambiguous personality traits). This suggests that the absence of 
cognitive resources increases one’s penchant to succumb to an environmentally prompted 
stimulus bias. In addition, the pattern of results also indicates that when processing 
capacity is not similarly limited, the magnitude of self-serving biases diminishes, even 
when the stimuli are ambiguous and hence easy to distort in a motivationally desirable 
direction. These results are thus consistent with the notion that under accuracy motivation 
cognitive resources may be channeled towards reducing the magnitude of biases in 
judgments by overriding the (biased) conclusions that readily come to mind. 
The second finding concerns judgments under directional motivation. Our results 
demonstrate that the magnitude of self-serving biases under directional motivation is 
reduced when information processing capacity is limited and stimuli are well-defined. 
This exemplifies the importance of reality constraints in judgments, as proposed by 
Kunda (1990). Specifically, when reality constraints are important, the lack of sufficient 
cognitive resources impedes one from reaching a desirable self-judgment. Indeed, our 
results show that the availability of cognitive resources yields self-serving biases of a 
greater magnitude irrespective of situational affordances, which suggests that under 
directional motivation, cognitive resources are utilized to overcome reality constraints. 
Taken together, our results suggest that stimulus ambiguity facilitates self-
enhancing judgments, whereas clear-cut stimuli have the opposite effect. However, 
individuals motivated to be accurate can limit the temptation to distort ambiguous stimuli 
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given that sufficient information processing capacity is available to them. In parallel, 
individuals motivated to reach a desired conclusion can overcome the constraints 
imposed by the environment given that sufficient information processing capacity is at 
their disposal. 
A third important finding was also brought to light in Study 2. Despite self-
serving biases being relatively less prominent under accuracy motivation, our results 
indicate that accuracy motivation does not entirely curb the above average effect. In the 
same vein, one’s desired judgment under directional motivation may occasionally stay a 
pie in the sky. Across our analyses, only two experimental groups appear not to have 
succumbed to such favorable, and apparently, impossible assessments of ability: 
participants under accuracy motivation with cognitive resources assessing negative clear-
cut personality traits and participants under directional motivation without cognitive 
resources assessing negative clear-cut traits. These findings seem to illustrate specific 
cases in which self-enhancement may be a tough nut to crack even for the most 
motivationally driven judgment makers. These results also suggest that negative clear-cut 
traits are more difficult to spin in a motivationally-congruent way than positively 
valenced clear-cut traits. This seems to suggest that individuals may generally be more 
motivated to achieve a positive self-image than motivated to achieve a less negative self-
image, a possibility that could be profitably pursued in subsequent research. 
General Discussion 
Motivation introduces goals to which cognitive strategies constitute means. 
Accuracy motivation fosters revision of beliefs and leads individuals to process 
information more deeply before committing to a judgment, whereas directional 
37 
motivation orients cognitive processes toward reaching a desired conclusion. The reality 
constraints in which a given cognitive task occurs specifies on a continuum the difficulty 
of motivated distortion. Cognitive resources are channeled to the appropriate set of 
cognitive processes suggested by the dominant motivation. The presence of cognitive 
resources allows information processing to be directed at either reaching an accurate 
decision, or overcoming reality constraints. In the absence of cognitive resources the 
dominant motivation, whether it be accuracy or directional motivation, has a lesser 
impact on judgment when reaching the desired judgment is made difficult.  In such a 
case, salient situational cues and ambiguous information may determine judgments to a 
greater degree irrespective of the motivational congruence of those cues. The present 
research based on the integration of motivation, cognitive resources, and situational 
affordances yielded results consistent with the foregoing perspective. 
 Specifically, the present results offer consistent support for our model of 
motivated reasoning in two unrelated domains; Study 1 examined its applicability to 
perceptual judgments, whereas Study 2 investigated self-related judgments. In both 
studies, it was found that under accuracy motivation the magnitude of biases in judgment 
was stronger when reality constraints were low and cognitive resources were limited. In 
contrast, it was found that under directional motivation, the magnitude of judgment bias 
was at its lowest when insufficient cognitive resources were available to overcome 
challenging reality constraints. 
 The confidence in these findings is bolstered by different experimental 
manipulations for every component of our model. In Study 1, motivation was 
subliminally primed using a lexical decision task, whereas in Study 2 motivation was 
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manipulated by giving accountability instructions and a recall task of academic failure. 
Aside from showing that our model of motivated reasoning is not limited to specific 
motives such as the need to belong (Study 1) or self-enhancement motives (Study 2), the 
converging effects of our different motivation manipulations support the notion that 
accuracy and directional motivation can either be consciously or unconsciously activated. 
This finding is consistent with the goal literature that generally shows that conscious and 
unconscious goal-pursuit produce similar outcomes (Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 
2007; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). 
Along the same lines, Study 2 also demonstrates that cognitive resources can be 
manipulated differently than by traditional methods (i.e., digit-retention; Miller, 1956). 
Our circadian rhythm methodology, which succeeded in reducing participants’ processing 
capacity, constitutes an ecologically valid manipulation with both applied and theoretical 
implications. For instance, many mental functions are dependent upon the presence of 
sufficient cognitive resources. As a consequence, testing periods in laboratory settings 
may need to be carefully recorded for one to fully take into account the potential 
influence of circadian rhythms. 
Study 1 and Study 2 also used different manipulations of situational affordances. 
In Study 1, visual cues were used to manipulate information accessibility, whereas in 
Study 2, we relied on stimulus ambiguity to manipulate reality constraints. Our results 
thus suggest that our model applies to different expressions of reality constraints. 
Theoretical Implications 
 The case for motivated reasoning has been a topic of intense debate over the 
years. After the rivalry between “hot” (motivational) versus “cold” (cognitive) 
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perspectives finally subsided, the motivated reasoning research agenda then prioritized 
the investigation of the boundary conditions of the influence of motives on judgment. 
Research’s first forays into these topics concerned the studying of “reality constraints” 
(Kunda, 1990) and “elasticity” (Hsee, 1996), two analogous concepts addressing the 
relevance of environmental influences on judgment making.  According to these 
concepts, the extent of motivated distortion is constrained by one’s ability to construct 
rational justifications to support one’s judgment. As a consequence, ambiguous 
information and available justifications ease off the difficulty of spinning information in a 
motivationally-congruent way. 
The present research offers additional insights into the phenomenon of motivated 
reasoning by suggesting that “reality constraints” aren’t absolute and overcoming them is 
possible in the presence of sufficiently abundant cognitive resources and the right 
motivational state. In this sense, “more” (resources) is not necessarily “better” if by that 
term one understands a lessened bias. Indeed, across our studies we have seen time and 
again that given the presence of directional motivation and a sufficiently clear-cut (hence 
difficult to contort) informational stimulus, bias may occur only with the aid of adequate 
resources, presumably affording more extensive processing of the information in service 
of the desired judgment. 
In addition to these findings, the present research also illustrates that cognitive 
resources may also serve to attenuate motivational biases. Specifically, in cases where 
judgments are made under accuracy motivation, resources may help to override the 
(biased) conclusions that readily come to mind and therefore, lead to less biased 
judgments. However, as our results showed in Study 2, despite bringing grist to the mill 
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of accuracy, the presence of cognitive resources does not necessarily warrant the 
extinction of biases, but certainly helps to reduce their sheer magnitude. 
Future Research Directions  
 Although the present results are compelling, they do not fully address the scope of 
motivational biases. Additional work is needed to afford a fuller appreciation of the 
determinants and conditions of the occurrence of motivational biases. Specifically, two 
research questions require further probing in this regard: (1) the role of motivational 
magnitude in producing bias and (2) the underlying cognitive processes mediating 
(motivationally) biased and unbiased judgments. These are briefly considered in turn. 
 Whereas the present studies varied the presence/absence of cognitive resources 
needed to accomplish the motivationally guided biasing work, it seems plausible to 
assume that given sufficient magnitude of the biasing motivation such resources would be 
mobilized. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that highly motivated individuals (e.g., 
terminally ill patients, or person who have lost beloved others) are able to deny what to 
others appears as undeniable realities, simply by “wishing it so” (Kubler-Ross, 1969; 
Stroebe Hansson, Stroebe, & Schut, 2001). Thus, further research is needed to explore the 
possibility that even highly constraining (i.e., unambiguous) information can be distorted 
if the biasing motivation is appropriately strong. 
 Finally, the mechanisms for motivated reasoning also merit a careful empirical 
exploration.  Several possible underlying mechanisms mediating the effect of motives on 
judgment have been proposed. For instance Freud (1920) proposed that desired 
judgments can be achieved through the suppression, or even the denial, of undesirable 
anxiety-provoking information. Alternatively, Kunda (1990) has suggested that biased 
41 
memory search may be able to explain the entire gamut of motivational biases. Further 
work may seek to empirically document the functioning of such processes in motivated 
biases and the conditions under which each may be employed to afford the motivationally 
desired judgments and conclusions.  
Conclusion 
 The present research proposes a new interactive model of motivated reasoning 
where motivation, situational affordances, and cognitive resources play a pivotal role in 
predicting biases in judgment. By integrating these variables into a systematic model, we 
hope to reach a more complete understanding of the interplay of these variables in human 
reasoning. The current model provides a parsimonious framework to explain a large array 
of findings in the motivated reasoning literature, and pave the way to new theoretically 
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